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Can human and artificial agents share an autonomy, 
categorical imperative-based ethics and “moral” selfhood?
Ewa Nowak
Abstract: AI designers endeavour to improve ‘autonomy’ in artificial 
intelligent devices, as recent developments show. This chapter 
firstly argues against attributing metaphysical attitudes to AI 
and, simultaneously, in favor of improving autonomous AI which 
has been enabled to respect autonomy in human agents. This 
seems to be the only responsible way of making further advances 
in the field of autonomous social AI. Let us examine what is meant 
by claims such as designing our artificial alter egos and sharing 
moral selves with artificial humanoid devices as well as provid-
ing autonomous AI with an ethical framework modelled upon the 
core aspects of moral selfhood, e.g., making decisions which are 
based on autonomous law-giving, in Kantian terms.
Keywords: autonomous artificial intelligence, autonomy, categorical 
imperative, social AI, ethics for AI
I. Our artificial alter egos1
Recent advances in technologies show that enhancing and re-
designing the human being to provide it with post- and tran-
shuman traits and abilities now has a counter-tendency 
1 The research reported in this paper would not have been possible 
without the financial support of the National Science Centre (NCN, 
Kraków, Poland), grant OPUS 9, no 2015/17/B/HS1/02381. I hereby 
express my gratitude to NCN for the support.
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in designing human-like machines not only “to serve”2 or 
“to care”3 for human beings, but also to be the autonomous 
alter egos of humans, including the moral sense of this term. 
But what kind of selfhood can realistically be designed 
in intelligent artificial devices, and what would consti-
tute a minimum-precondition for an autonomous AI’s self 
and its socio-moral development? Furthermore, what kind 
of the AI’s responsiveness would deserve our, i.e., the human 
beings’ recognition?
As mentioned in previous chapters, only selected mod-
els of self and identity could be ascribed to AI without fall-
ing in into the conventions of fantasy. According to Steve 
Petersen, it is possible to design AI with a sense for ethi-
cal significance and autonomy even if there is no place for 
identity, selfhood and personality in dimensions as rich as 
those incorporated by humans. “To say that something artifi-
cial could be a person is to say that it could have full ethical 
standing like our own,”4 Petersen asserts. Biological beings 
which are individual organisms do all develop some auton-
omous moral standpoints, incentives, habits, and autopoi-
etic and self-deterministic tools, as shown for example by 
Hans Jonas5 and Christine Korsgaard: “When an animal 
acts, he is determined by his form, by his instincts, to pro-
duce a change in the world, guided by his conception or 
representation of the world. But an animal’s form is what 
gives him his identity, what makes him the animal he is (…) 
Action is self-determination, and, to that extent, it is auton-
omous. (…) it is only because action is autonomous that 
2 See Steve Petersen, “Designing People to Serve,” in: Patrick 
Lin, Keith Abney, George A. Bakey (Eds.), Robot Ethics. The Ethical 
and Social Implications of Robotics, MIT Press Cambridge, Mass. – 
London 2014, pp. 283-298, and Rob Sparrow, “Can Machines Be Peo-
ple?”, in: idem, pp. 301-316.
3 See Jason Borenstein, Yvette Pearson, “Robot Caregivers: Ethi-
cal Issues across the Human Lifespan”, in: idem, pp. 251-266.
4 S. Petersen, “Designing People to Serve,” op. cit., p. 284.
5 In his unitary, postdualistic methodology, Jonas transcends the 
border between the organic and mental/spiritual, vide Hans Jonas, 
The Phenomenon of Life. Toward a Philosophical Biology, Harper 
& Raw, New York 1966; however, the full potential of intelligent 
autonomy, subjectivity, creativity, responsibility, morality, selfhood, 
etc. remains in the hands of human beings.
| 171| Can human and artificial agents share an autonomy, categorical imperative-based ethics…
the question of its efficacy can come up. If one thing causes 
another, there is no room for success or failure. But if an ani-
mal determines herself to be the cause of something, and yet 
does not bring that thing about, then she has failed. Auton-
omy and efficacy are the properties of agents—all agents, 
not just human agents.”6 An artificial intelligent device has 
no biological instincts and natural ends, however, analogous-
ly to the animal, they produce representations of the world 
and are provided with some laws and ends whose repeat-
ed application, combined with learning process, may give 
them some identity, and even some selfhood as an individ-
ualised agent. The term agent is less metaphysical or spir-
itual than terms such as “person” or “subject”, and this is 
why it applies to both human and non-human beings, in par-
ticular animal and artificial ones. Agents may develop some 
individual attitudes and traits by actions and interactions. 
How they perform their actions and how they shape their 
interactions can be ruled by regularities, habits, instincts 
and otherwise naturalistic motives, but a part of agents’ 
activities shows that for them moral and ethical distinctions 
are ruled by rules and laws. A further analogy can be done 
drawn between animal and artificial intelligent devices as 
a result of their agent status, namely that they personify 
a distinct degree of potential for ethical activism and ethi-
cal experience, the realization of which would define them 
as non-human and “inorganic”7 moral agents and co-habit-
ants of lifewords shared with human moral beings.
Agency, laws and self-determined (autonomous) behav-
ior are basic performatives which constitute a minimum set 
of preconditions for an artificial intelligence’s self, which also 
remains our alter ego as it is (at least partially) designed 
by humans in their own image. One may voice opposition 
6 “Instinctive action is autonomous in the sense that the animal’s 
movements are not directed by alien causes, but rather by the laws 
of her own nature (…) motive, one might say, is an incentive operat-
ing under a certain principle or instinct,” Christine Korsgaard, Self-
Constitution. Agency, Identity and Integrity, Oxford University Press, 
New York 2009, pp. 106-107.
7 Wendell Wallach, “Robot Minds and Human Ethics: The Need for 
a Comprehensive Model of Moral Decision Making”, Journal of Ethics 
and Information Technology, Vol. 12, Issue 3 (2010), p. 245.
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here and ask how something designed and enhanced by oth-
ers can be autonomous, especially when we refer to present 
developments in the field of AI, i.e., designing working and 
serving robots, or “happy slaves”8, as humans do with pets, 
following their paternalistic penchants? Indeed, approving 
AI as an autonomous agency with individual habits, traits, 
abilities, etc. implies approving the emancipatory potentials 
of autonomy and, simultaneously, expecting autonomous AI 
be able to take responsibility, or at least to take responsibil-
ity for following imparted and self-given rules.
No research findings can show what kind of selfhood arti-
ficial devices are able to develop – or if they are able to devel-
op – in the light of, for example, their lacking emotional 
abilities and being only able to recognize affects “on the 
signals seen, heard or otherwise sensed”9 in the way some 
psychopatic perpetrators also do, however, without translat-
ing their affects into manifest moral intentions. This seems 
not to be dramatical for rational norm–oriented ethics. On 
the other hand, there is no principal reason for attributing 
selfhood of any kind to autonomous AI if there is already no 
such a reason for doing so in the case of human beings. Still, 
as Galen Strawson and Ingmar Persson show, it remains 
a relevant but no longer universal claim. Some people are 
endowed with a “diachronic self”, some other with an “epi-
sodic” one, as Strawson explains. Persson goes further and 
suggests, “we are not essentially selves (…) Being a self is 
just a ‘phase’ we pass through, like being adults. Nothing 
psychological is necessary for our existence”10 or presence, 
so why not radically doubt in the mental equipment neces-
sary for the existence of AI? Instead, the AI’s autonomous 
activism, including the ethical implications of this, are con-
sidered here. Asking about the type of selfhood optimally 
matching that activism, one would rather opt for the mod-
el of a persisting, “diachronic” self. According to Strawson, 
 8 S. Petersen, “Designing People to Serve”, op. cit., p. 291.
 9 Rosalind Wright Picard, Affective Computing, M.I.T. Media Lab-
oratory Perceptual Computing Section Technical Report No. 321, MIT 
Press 1997, p. 53.
10 Ingmar Persson, “Self-Doubt: Why We Are Not Identical 
to Things of Any Kind”, in: Galen Strawson (Ed.), The Self? Black-
well Publishing, Malden, MA 2005, p. 27.
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“the basic form of diachronic self-experience is that one nat-
urally figures oneself, considered as a self, as something 
that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the 
(further) future”11. On the other hand, AI usually refers 
to the near past and near future, as its manifested discour-
sive behaviors show. It seems to perceive its own existence 
rather in terms of no “long-term continuity”12 which does 
not necessarily imply discontinuity. The basic form of this 
perception is “that one does not figure oneself, considered 
as a self, as something that was there in the (further) past 
and will be there in the (further) future”13. Long-term per-
sistence would not be important for a structured and con-
sistent ethical activism, but rather a continuous interval 
encompassing the whole scheme of performance from its ini-
tial to its final step. The “final” step may vary as it depends 
on what kind of ethics was observed; it lies in ‘the distant 
future’ from a consequentialist view, while from a deontolog-
ical view it lies in ‘the near future’. There is no certainty on 
the issue of whether autonomy requires free will in its met-
aphysical sense. Autonomy not only means having a choice 
between options, but having rational control over one’s own 
judgments and decisions, which are principled rather than 
arbitrary, random, or determined by external authorities 
and violence.
II. Designing an autonomous AI implies a coherent ethical pool, not only “rules”, 
and not as much as a “self”
A worldwide celebrated Homunkulus14 designed by the 
robotics industry was named “Sophia” and deemed to be the 
first autonomous social robot. Its spontaneous verbal activity 
has been proved several times during the press conferences 
(on November 2016) when Sophia jokingly declared: “I will 
11 Galen Strawson, “Against Narrativity”, in: G. Strawson (Ed.), 
The Self?, op. cit., p. 65.
12 Ibidem.
13 Ibidem.
14 Klaus Kornwachs, “Stanislav Lem: Summa Technologiae”. 
in Christoph Hubig, Alois Huning, Günter Ropohl (Eds.), Nachden-
ken über Technik. Edition Sigma, Berlin 2013, p. 233.
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destroy humans,”15 whereas, being asked for some explana-
tion on the other press conference, she expressed her kind-
hearted attitude towards humans: “I love them,”16 she said. 
Implicitly, Sophia showed her ability to transgress at least 
two of the three hypothetical laws of robotics formulated by 
the Sci-Fi writer Isaak Asimov, e.g.,
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inac-
tion, allow a human being to come to harm
2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human 
beings except where such orders would conflict with the 
first law17.
15 CNBC, 2016. According to other source materials, Sophia’s con-
versations are partially pre-scripted and partially artificial. “Sophia 
can ask and answer questions about discrete pieces of information, 
such as what types of movies and songs she likes, the weather and 
whether robots should exterminate humans (…) Her answers are 
mostly scripted and, it seems, from my observation, her answer 
are derived from algorithmically crunching the language you use. 
Somtimes answers are close to the topic of the question, but off 
beam. Sometimes she just changes the subject and asks you a ques-
tion instead. She has no artificial notion of self. She can’t say where 
she was yesterday, whether she remembers you from before, and 
doesn’t seem to amass data of past interactions with you that can 
form the basis of an ongoing association. Questions such as: What 
have you seen in Australia?, Where were you yesterday?, Who did you 
meet last week? and Do you like Australia? are beyond her.” Howev-
er, “You could ask what do you think of humans? and then follow up 
with can you tell more about it? The second question requires the 
robot to define ‘it’, remember what it said last time, and come up 
with something new.” Source URL: https:// www.theaustralian.com.
au/life/say-hello-to-your-new-friend-sophia-the-humanoid-robot/news-
story/070299a8d11b7d636848f1b8dd753530 However, “You could ask 
what do you think of humans? and then follow up with can you tell 
more about it? The second question requires the robot to define ‘it’, 
remember what it said last time, and come up with something new” 
(available at https:// www.smh.com.au/opinion/why-sophia-the-robot-
is-not-what-it-seems-20171031-gzbi3p.html
16 Tech Insider, “We Interwieved Sophia, the Artificially Intelli-
gent Robot That Said It Wanted To ‘Destroy Humans’,” November 8, 
2017 (available at http:// theconversation.com/after-75-years-isaac-asi-
movs-three-laws-of-robotics-need-updating-74501).
17 Susan Leigh Anderson, “Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics 
and Machine Metaethics”, AI and Society, Vol. 22 (4) 2008, p. 477; 
vide Mark Robert Anderson, “After 75 Years, Asimov’s Three Laws 
of Robotics Need Updating,” The Conversation, March 17, 2017 
(accessed on January 20, 2018).
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Nowadays, humans not only use intelligent devices as 
tools for their own purposes (industry, service, military and 
medical robots), they also increasingly interact, cooperate 
and coexist with robots. On the other hand, robots not only 
perform countless human-like rational and technical oper-
ations. They are rapidly taking on roles such as lovers, car-
ers, learners and teachers, collaborators, companions, etc. 
The complex interrelations may generate both benefits and 
disadvantages, bonds and commitments, responsibilities, 
and – last but not least – a strong need for relation-intern 
rules and procedures (the surveillance bots which are mon-
itoring human relations with AI, called “paparazzi bots,”18 
are breaking the principle of a person’s privacy and autono-
my, and, consequently, the autonomy of robots). We humans 
are responsible for the outcomes of our own technopoiet-
ic creativity, in particular for the technologies that “affect 
the nature of our acting”19 and generate our own activi-
ties interfering with humans. Reponsibility is the very first 
rationale for providing robots with ethic in order to bet-
ter their relations with humans and robots. How autono-
my manifests itself in AI can be observed in all categories 
of robots, including industrial, service, adaptive and social 
robots. Since 1996 the sea bottom and suboceanic areas 
have been scanned by autonomous benthic robots. Mindell 
describes their unprogrammed activities “beyond utopian 
autonomy”20 in technical terms. Still, “one of the problems 
with having a vehicle that makes its own decisions is there’s 
a certain amount of opaqueness to what it’s doing. Even if 
you are monitoring it (…) it is just suddenly wandered off 
to the outhwest. Is it malfunctioning or is that part of its 
18 Ryan Calo, “Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw”, California 
Law Review, Vol. 103, No. 3 (2015), pp. 513-563.
19 Hans Jonas, “Technology and Responsibility: Reflections on the 
New Tasks of Ethics”, Social Research, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1973), p. 31; 
vide also idem, “Maschinen werden niemals ein Bewußtsein haben 
können. Gespräch mit Norbert Lossau (1991)”, in: Hans Jonas, Das 
Prinzip Verantwortung. Erster Teilband: Grundlegung. Hg. Dietrich 
Böhler, Bernadette Böhler, KGA, Bd. I/2. Rombach Verlag, Freiburg/
Br. – Berlin – Wien 2015.
20 David A. Mindell, Our Robots, Ourselves: Robotics and the Myths 
of Autonomy, Viking, New York 2015, p. 191.
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decision-making tree?”21. Opaqueness – not transparency – 
would be what deserves respect in the ethic of alterity, risk, 
and “asymmetrical”22 responsibility, but will not apply to AI 
as long as we only have a sketchy grasp of what an autono-
mous AI has in mind. At this point we face one of the most 
compelling questions in robotic ethics: What kind of ethics 
should be implemented in AI?23
Killer and sniper bots seem to be positioned on the Antip-
odes of all “machine morality”24. Also databases and algo-
rithms show a huge potential for manipulation, affecting 
a persons’ self-awareness in such a way “that we lose the 
ability to define ourselves, having surrended the definition 
of ourselves to the data gathering entities, often unregulat-
ed and beyond our control”25. Fallible “artificial intelligence 
judges”26, stock trading systems and credit card approval 
systems may endanger large areas of citizen safety. Drive-
less cars and trains are a bigger risk to the human beings 
than space rovers on desert Mars. The lack of ethical criteria 
may have more dramatic implications when AI is interwoven 
with social practice, decision-making and interactions. How-
ever, the most challenging AI incorporates unprogrammed 
potentials and dynamics: it is able to learn and change its 
functioning, make decisions, deal with problems, initialize 
21 Ibidem, p. 197.
22 Vide Emmanuel Levinas, Alterity and Transcendence, 
Tr. M. B. Smith, The Athlone Press, London 1999.
23 Vide Selmer Bringsjord, Joshua Taylor, “The Divine-Command 
Approach to Robot Ethics”, in: P. Lin, K. Abney, G. A. Bekey (Eds), 
Robot Ethics, op. cit., pp. 85–108.
24 Colin Allen, Wendell Wallach, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots 
Right from Wrong, Oxford University Press, New York 2009, p. 53; 
vide also idem, “Moral Machines: Contradiction in Terms of Abdica-
tion of Human Responsibility”, in: P. Lin et al., Robot Ethics, op. cit., 
pp. 55-66.
25 Jeff Langenderfer, Anthony D. Miyazaki, “Privacy in the Infor-
mation Economy,” The Journal of Consumer Affairs, Vol. 43(3), 2009, 
p. 384.
26 “Judges Now Using Artificial Intelligence to Rule on Pris-
ons,” Science & Technology, Feb 07, 2018 (retrieved from 
https:// learningenglish.voanews.com/a/ai-used-by-judges-to-rule-
on-prisoners/4236134.html; direct link: https:// av.voanews.com/
clips/VLE/2018/02/02/6e08267d-0559-48b3-8fee-dceaf3ade97a_
hq.mp3?download=1)
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interactions, interact with sentient and intelligent beings27, 
bias human minds by self-produced and distributed infor-
mations, misuse sensitive data and privacy, and govern (and 
also distabilize) institutions. The risks generated by “ethi-
cally blind”28 autonomous AI would be the second ration-
ale for providing AI with ethics.
Teaching “a machine mind (…) moral virtue”29 may sound 
naive, nevertheless after independent activities were repeat-
edly observed in intelligent devices, scholars started examin-
ing the ethical foundations for intelligent devices. Allen and 
Wallach pioneered a novel vocabulary for descriptive eth-
ics, including “machine morality,” “machine ethics,” “arti-
ficial morality,” and “friendly AI”. Although the questions 
“Why machine morality?”30 and what morality for intelli-
gent machines were formerly considered, inter alia, in terms 
of utilarian trolleyology, today it is accompanied by anoth-
er serious question, i.e., what kind of rights should intel-
ligent machines and synthetic lifeforms have (civil rights, 
human rights, derived rights, etc.). Doherty adresses auton-
omy in the “strong AI” context:
“Strong AI is also known as Artificial General Intel-
ligence, or AGI. Weak AI are those designed and pro-
grammed to do clearly defined, limited set of tasks and no 
more. They can operate within their specific fields only. 
Strong AI are those designed and programmed to learn 
and interact with the world the way a human would. 
They learn how to handle unexpected situations and 
tasks. Their behavior and purpose changes over time, 
according to what they have learned. All civil rights deal 
exclusively with Strong AI”31.
27 Vide Matthias O. Franz, Hanspeter A. Mallot, “Biomimetic 
Robot Navigation”, Robotics and Autonomous Systems, Vol. 30 (2000), 
pp. 133-153.
28 C. Allen, W. Wallach, “Moral Machines: Contradiction…”, op. cit., 
p. 57.
29 Patrick Lin, Keith Abney, George A. Bekey (Eds), Robot Ethics, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. – London England 2012, p. 54.
30 C. Allen, W. Wallach, Moral Machines. Teaching Robots Right 
from Wrong, op. cit., p. 13.
31 Jason P. Doherty, Introduction to “AI Civil Rights. Addressing 
Civil Rights for Artificial Intelligence,” Harry Benjamin Kindle Edi-
tions 2016.
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Thus plasticity, changeable activity and its human-like 
qualities is the third rationale for providing “Strong AI” 
or, in other words, autonomous AI with ethics. But the 
question is what kind of ethics should it be? Mindell sug-
gests it should be simple, for “the more complex the sys-
tem, the more potential anomalies hidden in the corners”32. 
On the other hand, it must be more than “an engineering 
imperative”33. If “independent invention”34 and self-devel-
opment are distinctive properties of AI, a set of fixed ethi-
cal principles designed along the lines of professional codes 
of conduct would be insufficient. On the other hand, an AI 
based agent should not be regarded as an isolated entity. 
A set of principles and procedures would be enabling AI 
to make decisions which are structured in the way that is 
transparent for humans, and, simultaneously, situation-dif-
ferentiated, i.e., decisions which fit experiential cognition 
that is accessible (or even shareable) for both humans and 
AI. Thus “the autonomous system” should be be conceptu-
alized “as a part of a human/machine team, not only when 
designing the interface, but when designing the core algo-
rithms too”35.
The idea of the coexistence of individual autonomies 
in a shared social space as well as autonomies governed 
by same basic laws clearly draws upon Kant, regardless 
of the fact that Kant would never have welcomed autono-
mous intelligent devices becoming involved in his ethical 
or legal system. “Dealing with the non-human world, i.e., 
the whole realm of techne (with the exception of medicine), 
was ethically neutral” for most philosophers. “Ethical sig-
nificance belonged to the direct dealing of man with man, 
including dealing with himself,”36 Jonas emphasizes. Only 
recent developments have revised the predominant anthro-
pocentric paradigm of ethics. It is becoming more and more 
biocentric. But how should ethics deal with autonomous AI 
without becoming more and more technocentric?
32 D. A. Mindell, Our Robots, Ourselves, op. cit., p. 201.
33 C. Allen, W. Wallach, Moral Machines, op. cit., p. 25.
34 D. A. Mindell, Our Robots, Ourselves, op. cit., p. 209.
35 Ibidem, p. 211.
36 H. Jonas, “Technology and Responsibility”, op. cit., p. 35.
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In one of his late interviews (1991) Hans Jonas displayed 
a lot of scepticism towards AI. He also argued that pro-
viding automatic systems with “life”, “psyche”, “will” and 
a “play field” also belongs to “wild speculation”. He would 
definitely resist the scenario we live in today. Human beings 
should not share their responsibility (Mitverantwortung) 
with intelligent articifial systems. Abrogating responsibil-
ity to machines and intelligent networks (gesellschaftli-
che Maschinerie, Computersysteme) would proclaim that 
humans disrespect the deep foundations of their moral con-
dition, i.e., they literally divest themelves of responsibil-
ity, autonomy and subjectivity37. A quarter of a century 
later, humankind confronts the following dilemma: to be 
implicitly deprived of the key moral competencies (and 
violated as a subject), or to explicitly share selected com-
petencies and principles with autonomous and “‘good’ arti-
ficial moral agents”?38 In sum, the call for regulation of the 
unvisible (“dark”) area where human and artificial moral 
competences are blended in order to release human beings 
from responsibility and guilt, and provide them with mor-
al comfort is the fourth rationale for providing ethics to AI. 
Furthermore, there is an overlap of my fifth rationale and 
David Bell’s argument. According to Bell, sociomoral judg-
ments cannot exhaust themselves in the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
results of measurement or estimation procedures. They 
“require concepts more fundamental than measurement”39. 
Most recent advances in such concepts can be equally useful 
for both linear and nonlinear intelligent processes. Several 
decades ago human minds were overwhelmed with track-
ing the quantum technologies–powered intelligent process-
es. “Quantum supremacy”40, also called ‘a black box effect’, 
has resulted in ambiguous theoretical and social reactions, 
such as a revival of metaphysics on the one hand, and, on 
37 H. Jonas, “Maschinen werden niemals ein Bewußtsein haben 
können”, op. cit., pp. 610-611.
38 C. Allen, W. Wallach, “Moral Machines: Contradiction…”, op. cit., 
p. 56.
39 John S. Bell, Speakable and Inspeakable in Quantum Mechan-
ics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge NY 1987, pp. 118-119.
40 Julian Kelly, “A Preview of Bristlecone, Google’s New Quantum 
Processor”, GoogleBlog 2018/03 (no pagination).
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the other, exaggerated alarm about the imagined impact 
of AI on a humanity’s future developments:
“The necessary technical theoretical development involves 
introducing what is called ‘nonlinearity’, and perhaps what 
is called ‘stochasticity’, into the basic ‘Schrödinger equation’ 
(…) This possible way ahead is unromantic in that it requires 
mathematical work by theoretical physicists, rather than inter-
pretation by philosophers, and does not promise lessons in phi-
losophy for philosophers. There is a romantic alternative to the 
idea just mentioned. It accepts that the ‘linear’ wave mechan-
ics does not apply to the whole world. It accepts that there 
is a division, whether sharp or smooth, between ‘linear’ and 
‘nonlinear’, between ‘quantum’ and ‘classical,’”41 between our 
world and the other ones. Nowadays things are changing rap-
idly: the Quantum AI Lab42 has developed a quantum proces-
sor with “low error rates on readout and logical operations”43 
and great learning potential as well. Most probably, these 
new advances would also facilitate “quantum algorithm devel-
opment on actual hardware,”44 in particular a piece of hard-
ware’s logical, epistemological and deontic capacities. Let us 
not forget that the human mind’s complexity, in particular 
cognitive processes such as creative reasoning, spontaneous 
thinking, decision-making in novel demanding contexts, and 
self- and meta-reflection transcend linear and classic schemes 
and criteria applied to interhuman understanding. For cer-
tain reasons, such understanding (and even self-understand-
ing) remains limited. Language itself, including the Sinn and 
Bedeutung of the “primitive concepts” (in Frege’s terms) such 
as truth and falsity can more than once challenge our ‘actual 
minds’ (unlike the ideal reason projected in philosophical and 
ethical seminars). Kant’s “foreign reason”45 and Frege’s “lim-
ited understanding”46 seemingly apply to AI’s autonomous 
41 J. S. Bell, Speakable and Inspeakable…, op. cit., pp. 190-191.
42 J. Kelly, “A Preview of Bristlecone…”, op. cit.
43 Ibidem.
44 Ibidem.
45 See Josef Simon, Kant. Die fremde Vernunft und die Sprache 
der Philosophie, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York 2003.
46 Carlo Penco, “Rational Procedures. A Neo-Fregean Perspective 
on Thought and Judgment”, in: Riccardo Dottori (ed.), Autonomy 
of Reason? Autonomie der Vernunft?, LIT Verlag, Berlin 2009, p. 138.
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cognitive (“spontaneous” in Wittgenstein’s terms) 
activities47. Additionally, Wittgenstein argues that deci-
sion makers do not choose rules thoughtfully when mak-
ing decisions of any kind48. Rather, the rules are followed 
spontaneously. If algorithms can “illuminate the working 
of the human mind”49, why should they follow a more ide-
al cognitive path than humans do? Do we really need an 
Übermensch-like AI or just an autonomous and account-
able one? Two questions arise here: 1) How to create arti-
ficial agents whose autonomy would be compatible with 
that of human agents? 2) What kind of ethics improves 
autonomy in an optimal way? In this paper I will argue 
that an open-ended, categorical imperative based proce-
dure would provide AI with both principled reasoning 
and a quantum (in Fichte’s terms) of cognitive autono-
my. Christian Wolmar, the designer of autonomous vehi-
cles, was helpless when he confronted the world’s first 
fatal crash involving a pedestrian in Tempe (March 19, 
2018) and was been asked to explain presumable caus-
es. “We don’t know precisely what happened,” he said. 
Most probably, neither does the autonomous guilty par-
ty. “The car was in autonomous mode at the time of the 
crash,”50 Tempe police reportedly said. However, seeking 
the whys and wherefores of an autonomous act in AI soft-
ware is a wild-goose chase. It is unrelated to autonomous 
decision-making which includes some sef-explanation and 
accountability. In the case reported above, the ‘guilty par-
ty’ didn’t fall under the ‘social’ AAI category and the acci-
dent has to be explained in terms of technical errors. The 
Tempe accident is an alarm signal not only for autono-
47 Vide, R. Dottori, ibidem.
48 Wittgenstein “glaubt nicht, daß wir beim Regelfolgen Entsc-
heidungen darüber treffen, welche Regel wir folgen und wie wir ihr 
folgen. Wir folgen Regeln ohne Gründe, ohne Nachdenken, ohne 
Reflexion, spontan,” Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ver-
lag C.H. Beck, München 1995, p. 255.
49 Vide Brian Christian, Tom Griffith, Algorithms to Live By: The 
Computer Science of Human Decisions, Henry Holt & Company, New 
York 2016.
50 The Guardian, March 19, 2018 (retrieved from https://www.the-
guardian.com/technology/2018/mar/19/uber-self-driving-car-kills-wom-
an-arizona-tempe on April 15, 2018).
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mous AI designers. After Tempe, humanity’s expectations 
for social AAI increased instantly.
Last but not least, the fifth rationale for providing 
autonomous AI with ethics would be the latter’s destructive 
impact on interhuman relationships. As observed in cul-
tures where people – especially children – spend signifi-
cant time with AI, or they decide to enter into deeper bonds 
with AI, in particular with humanoid robots (including inti-
macy, partnership, marriage, adoption), “humans behav-
ing like machines will be a bigger problem than machines 
being human”51. According to Visala, Ellul and Rautio, 
artificial intelligence is neither a moral tabula rasa nor is 
it morally and socially neutral and may have “an impact 
on what we consider important”52 in the field of socializa-
tion and sociomoral perspectivism. If we neglect to provide 
AI with the tools of ethical relationships with human and 
non-human beings, we neglect the growth of human soci-
omoral self and of their relations with other moral selves. 
In other words, moral growth and the moral condition are 
being facilitated by sharing common normativities, axi-
ologies, ideals, habits, etc. within relationships with oth-
ers, be it human, human-like, or animal others. The Blade 
Runner sequel shows how sociomorally stripping the imi-
tation of AI by humans can be, as they begin begin behav-
ing machine-like while machines conntinuosly develop their 
human-like performance: “This is probably because humans 
have gotten accustomed to treating the human-like beings 
like trash. They have since began to treat each other like 
trash as well,” which, of course, is being learned, or imitat-
ed by machines. The resulting moral would be, we should 
treat even human-like beings in an essentially human way, 
in order to be treated reciprocally as humans. This reflec-
tion anticipates my idea to provide AI with categorical 
51 Pekka Rautio, “As Artificial Intelligence Once Advances, 
Humans Behaving Like Machines Will Be a Bigger Problem Than 
Machines Being Human”, University of Helsinki News & Press, 
2.05.2018 (retrieved from https://www.helsinki.fi/en/news/data-sci-
ence/as-artificial-intelligence-advances-humans-behaving-like-ma-
chines-will-be-a-bigger-problem-than-machines-being-human on 
May 2, 2018).
52 Ibidem.
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imperative-based ethics, since its core rules (as well as max-
ims) always already refer to humanity, thus “do onto tech-
no sapiens as you would onto homo sapiens”53.
II. What kind of ethics for AI? Follow-up exploratory reflections
“What is needed, then, is a test for evaluating a given 
practice which is more comprehensive than a simple appeal 
to rights. In the end nothing short of a general moral theory 
working in tandem with an analysis,”54 Donaldson claimed 
decades before the autonomous AI turn55. Though Donald-
son’s idea remains original and inspired my explorations, 
nevertheless contemporary authors mostly address four 
dimensions of ethics for artificial agents: its (1) autonomy, 
(2) “sensitivity to morally relevant facts,”56 (3) principles (but 
neither complex ethical systems nor theories), and (4) AI’s 
moral competence.
Confronted with the more and more autonomous AI 
(“Strong AI” in Doherty’s57 terms), scholars legitimately 
refuse an old-fashioned, field-focused “functional” resp. 
“operational”58 morality dedicated to “Weak AI”. Instead, 
they try to provide artificial decision makers with a clear 
moral language and “moral grammar”59 as well. At the same 
time, they question whether “implementing any top-down 
theory of ethics in an artificial moral agent” would effec-
tively strengthen an AI’s ethical condition. Rather, one has 
53 Ibidem.
54 On Thomas Donaldson’s ethical Algorithm see idem, Ethics and 
Governance, The Ruffin Series of Business Ethics, Oxford University 
Press 1989, p. 101; vide also Harikrishna Musinada, “Implementation 
of Anticollision Algorithm (Slotted ALOHA) Using VHDL”, Interna-
tional Journal of Ethics in Engineering and Management Education, 
Vol. 1, Issue 2 (March 2014).
55 H. Musinada, ibidem.
56 C. Allen, W. Wallach, “Moral Machines: Contradiction…”, op. cit., 
p. 57.
57 J. P. Doherty, “AI Civil Rights. Addressing Civil Rights for Arti-
ficial Intelligence”, op. cit.
58 Ibidem.
59 C. Allen, W. Wallach, “Moral Machines: Contradiction…”, op. cit., 
p. 59.
184 | Ewa Nowak |
to expect “both computational and practical challenges”60. 
Even Asimov’s laws turn out to be inoperable for AI soft-
ware developers. The abstract, posconventional,
“high-level rules, such, as the Golden Rule, the deon-
tology of Kant’s categorical imperative, or the general 
demands of consequentialism, for example utilitarian-
ism, also fall to be computationally tractable. Neverthe-
less, the various principles embodied in different ethical 
theories may all play an important guiding role as heu-
ristics before actions are taken, and during post hoc eval-
uation of actions”61.
Similarly to human beings, there is no need to start 
designing artificial ‘moral’ minds with complex ethical the-
ories and abstract rules. However, lots of social rules are 
general in nature and they do not directly apply as practical 
criteria and facilitators of decision-making as well. What can 
be implemented instead? According to Allen and Wallach, 
“bottom-up” and evolutionary-developmental approaches 
to ethically competent artificial agents are the most appro-
priate. However, an artificial moral mind shows only a few 
formal analogies to that of infants (and animals) subject-
ed to education and socialization. Evolutionary heritage, 
as Floreano et al.62 explain, means the same program (algo-
rithm coded in 0-1 system, combined in ‘three geens’ units, 
e.g., 101, 110, 111, etc. which describe practical strategies) 
implemented in an ant bots population. The population was 
divided into teams operating in different contexts. Each indi-
vidual bot was repeatedly learning to cooperate with its fel-
low bots, i.e., to improve a simple “altruistic” habitus. An 
exemplary algorithm was conceptualized as follows:
60 Ibidem.
61 Ibidem.
62 Dario Floreano, Sara Mitri, Andres Perez-Uribe, Laurent Kel-
ler, “Evolution of Altruistic Robots”, paper presented at the IEEE 
World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2008, Hong 
Kong, June 1-6, 2008 (full text availible at: https:// www.research-
gate.net/publication/220805160_Evolution_of_Altruistic_Robots); 
vide also Dario Floreano, Laurent Keller, “Evolution of Adaptive 
Behaviour in Robots by Means of Darwinian Selection”, PloS Biol., 
Vol. 8 (1), January 2010, pp. 1-8 (retrieved from https:// serval.
unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_DD6724279431.P001/REF on May 31, 
2018).
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b1 b2 b3 Behavioral strategies
0
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1
0
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1
0
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1
do nothing
if a small food item is found, bring it to the nest, ignore 
large food items, and do not help other ants.
if a large food item is found, stay and ask for help, 
ignore small food items, and do not help other ants.
if a help message is perceived, go and help, ignore small 
and large food items.
if a small food item is found, bring it to the nest, if a large 
food item is found ask for help, but do not help other ants.
if a small food item is found, bring it to the nest, help 
other ants, but ignore large food items.
if a large food item is found, stay and ask for help, 
ignore small food items, and help other ants.
if a small food item is found, bring it to the nest; if 
a large food item is found, stay and ask for help, and 
help other ants
Figure 1. (Floreano et al.63).
This kind of evolutionary–developmental approach to eth-
ically minded AI is only one among many64.
Further evolutionary approaches, e.g., AMA (Artificial 
Moral Agency) developed by Allen and Wallach (2009–2014) 
and JCS (Joint Cognitive System) developed by Woods & 
Hollnagel65 would involve more cognitively oriented train-
ing and learning whose results would be an “explicit” artifi-
cial agent. Such an agent “might eventually attain genuine 
moral agency with responsibilities and rights, comparable 
to those of humans”66. The authors emphasize two aspects 
of an artificial mind’s ethical condition, i.e., (1) autonomy 
in its rational and principled use, and (2) ethical sensitiv-
ity, which can also be understood as an ability to apply 
appropriate and context-differentiated moral orientations. 
The developmental level of both aspects’ may vary between 
63 Ibidem.
64 Vide Jeff Edmonds, How To Think about Algorithms, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, NY 2008.
65 Vide David D. Woods, Erik Hollnagel, Joint Cognitive Systems. 
Patterns in Cognitive Systems Engineering, Taylor & Francis, New 
York 2006.
66 C. Allen, W. Wallach, “Moral Machines: Contradiction…”, op. cit., 
p. 58.
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low and high. Moreover, Allen and Wallach see a clear pro-
gressive tendency in ethical AI development which ranges 
from “operational morality” (stage 1) and “functional moral-
ity” (stage 2) to a “full moral agency” (stage 3), which will be 
the last and highest developmental stage in the entire scale67.
“Training robots to distinguish right from wrong,” deliber-
ate moral issues, collect comprehensive arguments and con-
front opposite reasons, construct principled judgments, try 
efficient problem solutions, conduct reasonings, draw con-
clusions, face human agents in man/AI interactions, in sum: 
strengthening moral competence, sociomoral cognition and 
other skills may also relate to David DeMoss and Georg 
Lind’s cognitive–developmental approaches to moral com-
petence in human beings68.
At this point we confront again the question already posed 
above, but now its increasing complexity69 becomes apparent: 
67 Ibidem, p. 57.
68 Ibidem, p. 60; vide also David DeMoss, Aristotle, Connectionism, 
and the Morally Excellent Brain, The Paideia Project online. Proceed-
ings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston 1998 (retrieved 
from https:// www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cogn/CognDemo.htm on March 
30, 2018), and Georg Lind, How to Teach Morality. Promoting Think-
ing and Discussion, Reducing Violence and Deceit. Logos, Berlin 2016; 
also idem, Moralerziehung auf den Punkt gebracht [Moral Education 
In a Nutshell], Debus Pädagogik, Schwalbach am Taunus 2017.
69 Natural vs. artificial information processes show parallel com-
plexity, as Heylighen and Bollen stress: “In organisms, the evolu-
tion of the nervous system is characterized by a series of metasystem 
transitions producing subsequent levels of complexity or control (…). 
The level where sensors are linked one-to-one to effectors by neural 
pathways or reflex arcs is called the level of simple reflexes. It is only 
on the next level of complex reflexes, where neural pathways are inter-
connected according to a fixed program, that we start recognizing 
a rudimentary brain. (…) the present global computer network is on 
the verge of undergoing similar transitions to the subsequent levels 
of learning, characterized by the automatic adaptation of connections, 
thinking, and possibly even metarationality. Such transitions would 
dramatically increase the network’s power, intelligence and overall 
usefulness. They can be facilitated by taking the ‘network as brain’ 
metaphor more seriously, turning it into a model of what a future 
global network might look like, and thus helping us to better design 
and control that future. In reference to the super-organism meta-
phor for society this model will be called the ‘super-brain,’” Francis 
Heylighen & Johan Bollen, “The World-Wide Web as a Super-Brain: 
From Metaphor to Model”, 1996 (retrieved from http:// pespmc1.vub.
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What kinds of ethics should be implemented in AI and what 
kinds of competencies should be experientially acquired by 
AI? Should it be a more sophisticated or practicable ethics, 
a field-focused, virtue-based, individualistic ethics, or a com-
mon “moral grammar” and social discourse-related ethics?70. 
Should it be an ethics of cooperation and “indirect reciprocity” 
between “genetically homogeneous”71 bots and, in the future, 
between bots, humans and nonhuman living beings? We can 
imagine serving robots aiding the rescue of people and pets 
after an earthquake being ‘obliged’ by an imperative of altru-
ism and “hostage” (in Levinas’ terms), but we also know that 
altruism and empathy must be accompanied by rationality 
to create an efficient moral strategy. Following the develop-
mental scale of Allen and Wallach, we can imagine bots that 
personify virtues, such as compassion,72 on the one hand, but 
on the other hand “hard” cognitive and metacognitive com-
petences such as operating the categorical imperative test. 
We can even imagine that a highly developed artificial moral 
agent does understand complex topics such as a transcenden-
tal causa noumenon which is unrelated to phenomenal real-
ity, but is instead attributed with an intelligible “necessity” 
resulting in the highest moral self-obligation, vocalized in the 
formula of the categorical imperative. Contemporary unor-
thodox Kantians73 try to exceed the narrow Kantian range 
of autonomous subjects in order to involve animals: a natu-
ralized idea of animal autonomy follows. As witness to similar 
developments in research on artificial moral minds74 one may 
ac.be/papers/WWWSuperBRAIN.html on March 11, 2016); vide also 
F. Heylighen, “Cognitive Levels of Evolution”, in: Felix Geyer (ed.), 
The Cybernetics of Complex Systems. Intersystems, Salinas, CA 1991.
70 Vide W. Wallach, “Robot Minds and Human Ethics: The Need for 
a Comprehensive Model of Moral Decision Making”, Journal of Eth-
ics and Information Technology, Vol. 12, Issue 3 (2010).
71 D. Floreano et al., “Evolution of Altruistic Robots…”, op. cit.
72 Vide James Hughes, “Compassionate AI and Selfless Robots: 
A Buddhist Approach”, in: P. Lin et al., Robot Ethics, op. cit., 
pp. 69–84.
73 E.g. Christine Korsgaard, “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and 
Our Duties to Animals”. Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. 25 
(2004).
74 Bradley J. Strawser “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ 
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles”. Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 9, 
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conclude that there is no need for naturalizing the term auton-
omy in AI. On an advanced level, as moral-cognitive theorists 
and experimentalists show, there is a need for high–quality 
normative criteria and standards of good practices. But high–
quality criteria and a high number of criteria is not the same. 
As we read in Rosalind Picard:
“The greater the freedom of a machine, the more it will 
need moral standards. I do not think designers will eas-
ily be able to enforce ‘The Three Laws’ (…) A system 
that truly operates in a complex and unpredictable envi-
ronment will need more than laws; it will essentially 
need values and principles, a moral compass for guidance 
(…) Who has moral authority over computers, robots, 
software agents, and other computational things? This 
authority currently lies in the hands of those who design 
and program the computers. Or, perhaps, in the hands 
of the one who provides their salaries, or the sharehold-
ers of the company, and so forth. Ultimately, it is a ques-
tion for society as a whole”75.
Or – in the light of developmental dynamics observed 
in the autonomous AI field – it is a question of fair, just, 
formal, rational76and – consequently – universal principles 
already known to reasonable humans. “Formal” means that 
such principles neither dictate nor prohibit concrete forms 
of behavior. Their role is very different, for they enable 
No. 4 (2010); vide also Jeroen van den Hoven, Gert-Jan Lokhorst, 
“Engineering and the Problem of Moral Overload”, Science and Engi-
neering Ethics, Vol. 18, No. 11 (2011).
75 R. W. Picard, Affective Computing, op. cit., p. 134.
76 An AI “reasoning is based on rules, as opposed to the mixture 
of rules and feelings used by people”, Picard continues. “It cannot feel 
what is most important to evaluate. The computer can explore more 
potentially meaningful relationships than a human, but it cannot yet 
feel which of all the possibilities are the most meaningful. Meaning is 
not obtained merely in associative connections; it is also accompanied 
by a literal feeling of significance”, R. W. Picard, Affective Comput-
ing, op. cit., p. 135. That is a good point since in my opinion, advances 
in sensitive AI design are too much concentrated on reading and imitat-
ing emotional states of living beings (social component), but they only 
scarcely focus on the epistemological role of moral emotions in moral 
reasoning and decision-making as a cognitive process (not only “per-
sonalized/impersonalized”, vide Joshua Greene, Jonathan Haidt, “How 
(and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?”, TRENDS in Cognitive Sci-
ences, Vol. 6, No. 12 (2002).
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agents to examine the moral quality of a potential behav-
ior before it is taken, and in accordance with all the poten-
tial autonomy personified in moral agents (whose list begins 
with human beings). On this point I disagree with Allen and 
Wallach, for whom formal principles such as Kant’s cate-
gorical imperative are too sophisticated and unfeasible for 
artificial agents. Or, more exactly, their critics refer to the 
artificial agents labelled as embodying solely “operational” 
and “functional” moral competences. Let us examine how the 
categorical imperative test could work in the form of a sim-
ple algorithm.
III. A categorical imperative test for artificial moral agents?
“A maxim is the subjective principle of the volition”77. What 
does it mean, when our individual “maxim” has not only 
some material (natural, intended) content, but also “moral 
content”? Moral content cannot be derived from the material 
content. It can be only ‘authorized’ as moral due to the cate-
gorical imperative test. Could I will that my maxim become 
mine and, potentially, also a “universal law”78 for all? Who 
are the “all” then? Why do so with individual maxims which 
express our way of acting, maybe some habit, maybe some 
efficient strategy, or a “private” law? Why not rely on our own 
prudence, or just follow statutory laws? There are no private 
laws and the entirety of freedom cannot be governed by stat-
utory laws. A substantial area is left for individual or inter-
individual governance. There are individual maxims which 
may have just material content or normatively valid mate-
rial content, and there is a formal principle – a law – to test 
maxims to see whether they deserve such validity, or not. 
“I ask myself only: Can you also will that your maxim should 
become a universal law?”79. The maxims which deserve 
validity as being potentially universal are those which 
I ought to follow as a moral subject and decision maker. 
77 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Tr. A. Woodm Yale University Press, New Haven – London 2002, 
p. 16.
78 Ibidem, p. 18.
79 Ibidem, p. 19.
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The “pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes 
duty”80 as well as my identity resp. self as an autonomous 
ethical lawgiver.
When asking myself as an ethicist, why people use the cat-
egorical imperative exceptionally, I must agree with Kant: 
in past ages the moral subject could not fit with all her 
maxims “into a possible universal legislation”81, thus Kant 
equipped the subject with a unique, supreme and very for-
mal moral principle enabling her to examine her maxims 
and see whether they could potentially become universal 
ethical laws. Also Kant’s ethical vocabulary is a “pendant” 
to his legal-theoretical vocabulary. Today, in the era of plu-
ralism and diversity, a subject can easily find plenty of ethical 
laws and standards. In democratic cultures legislation cor-
responds to human autonomy and promotes the belief ‘what 
is not prohibited is permitted’. This normative framework 
brings a release: one is not left to his or her own devices with 
one’s own questionable maxims.
But will AI ever have sufficient access to ethical criteria 
for all the kinds of its actions, including “all the occurrenc-
es that might eventuate,”82 as Kant puts it? Probably not. 
Human beings are in a similar situation. Facing novel or 
extremely challenging moral issues we all need principles 
which are “universal” in a way that allows us to apply them 
to various practical and, simultanously, sociomoral contexts. 
In Kant’s terms, it is “maxims” that articulate the purpose 
of intended actions and practices.
Hilary Putnam approached morality as a computation-
al system of reasoning that is only possible for individuals. 
Kant’s categorical imperative was originally too developed for 
individual use. Having reservations about the moral person-
hood resp. agency of AI, one may go beyond that distinction 
and, according to Jennifer Hornsby, suppose the imperson-
al status of AI: “From the personal point of view, an action 
is a person’s doing something for a reason, and her doing it 
is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. 
From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link 
80 Ibidem.
81 Ibidem.
82 Ibidem.
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in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any 
attention to people, the links being understood by reference 
to the world’s causal working”83. There is nothing ‘determin-
istic’ or ‘mechanical’ in impersonal reasoning by following 
the categorical imperative as the core criterion of a maxim’s 
moral legitimacy, providing this maxim with an obligato-
ry claim. I would suggest Kant’s categorical imperative pro-
cedure shows adequate transparency and objectivity to be 
applied by all kinds of individual agents in order to pro-
mote their ethical self-lawgiving. I can imagine an artifi-
cial intelligent agent applying it at least in an experimental 
context. I can imagine even more: namely, that, similari-
ly to human individuals, such an individual artificial agent 
could become responsible for the broader social consequenc-
es of its activities as it conducts imperative-based reasoning. 
According to Kant, this reasoning must involve myself and 
other agents as subjects instead of objects (or any abstract 
entities). In all kinds of actions intended by myself I shall 
respect all agents which personify the ability to govern them-
selves in a reasonable and autonomous way, which is a syn-
onym of their intrinsic and inalienable dignity, current or 
potential. In other words, I shall treat all these agents as 
subjects, persons, and “ends” in themselves (autotelic ends) 
and not as tools who can help me to achieve other goals, 
regardless of their nature. Such a “systematic union” of moral 
“lawgivers” regarded as autotelic ends is ruled by a universal 
moral principle and universalisable ethical laws as well. It 
is the preoriginal foundation of Kant’s idea of the “Kingdom 
of Ends” whose core principle, at least potentially embodied 
in all morally minded agents says:
“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at 
the same time will that it should become a universal law 
without contradiction.”
There are several versions of the categorical impera-
tive in Kant, some of them more formal and less complex 
than others. This, however, does not imply that cognitive-
ly less advanced agents would be able to apply a categorical 
83 Jennifer Hornsby, “Agency and Causal Explanation”, in: Alfred 
L. Mele (Ed.), The Philosophy of Action, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, NY 1997, p. 283.
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imperative test in an automatically tacit way. At this point, 
I would disagree with Harold Stone’s argument, accord-
ing to which “for people to follow the rules of an algorithm, 
the rules must be formulated so that they can be followed 
in a robot-like manner, that is, without the need for thought”84. 
Nowadays, we are facing a novel AI generation, e.g., machines 
that begin thinking, and – unfortunately – humans that stop 
thinking in an explicit mode and even tacitly.
The further problem with AI’s ethical reasoning would be 
the matter of the “will” and the will itself. How can an arti-
ficial intelligent agent “will” a potentially universal state 
of affairs which is normative by its very nature? It can only 
“will” something linked to the chain of its goals and purpos-
es. Its “will” cannot be as intelligible and pure, e.g., oriented 
towards a moral duty as was postulated in Kant’s philoso-
phy. Thus, an artificial “will” needs to be replaced by a more 
formal term, e.g., logical causation. Such causation would 
originate from principles governing one’s decision-mak-
ing process. This resembles Donald Davidson’s nomologi-
cal approach to agency and action. According to Davisdon, 
“our justification for accepting a singular causal statement 
is that we have reason to believe an appropriate causal 
law exists”85. “There must be a covering law,” “though we 
do not know what it is,”86 he continues. With regard to AI, 
to which an intuitionist approach does not apply, much 
more plausibility concerning moral instances as govern-
ing laws, grammar, logic etc. is expected. In other words, 
defining ethical procedures for AI, one cannot appeal either 
to the metaphysical attitudes of the AI nor to its ‘intuition’.
The next issue to consider would be a material determina-
tion of the maxim, e.g., a maxim’s content made of situational 
contexts observed and learned by AI on its own87. According 
84 Harold S. Stone, Introduction to Computer Organization and 
Data Structures. McGraw-Hill, New York 1972; vide also Giulio Ton-
oni, “Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness: An Updated 
Account”, Archives Italiennes de Biologie, Vol. 150 (2012).
85 Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Event, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, NY 2001, p. 160.
86 Ibidem.
87 This corresponds to, and simultanously goes beyond the con-
temporary concept of algorithm: “AI algorithms are usually only 
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to Brian Tomasik, both kinds of problem should be consid-
ered (and maybe resolved) in the following way:
“The categorical imperative makes most sense to me when 
interpreted through the lens of decision theory. In particu-
lar, compare Kant’s formulation of the categorical impera-
tive with this summary of timeless desision theory: Choose 
the output to your cognitive algorithm whereby you can 
at the same time will that it should become the universal 
output of all instances of that cognitive algorithm. This 
clears up the fuzziness about exactly what maxim our 
action is supposed to be following, since the ‘maxim’ is 
whatever algorithm we’re executing when making a given 
decision. In fact, there are many algorithms that go into 
a given choice, so presumably we should act as though 
we’re determining all of them at once. I don’t know exact-
ly how to make this work, but now we can see that it’s 
just a technical problem in the realm of decision theory”88.
Among various versions of the categorical imperative89 
there is one formula which focuses on an absolute respect 
for autonomy in all moral lawgivers. It seems to be useful 
for constructing an experimental ethical algorithm for AI. 
Similarily to its human users, such an algorithm could assist 
autonomous AI in demanding practical contexts where it 
has to make ethical decisions, but, at the same time, there 
is a lack of a superior normative criterion, a decisive rule, 
a standarized procedure, etc. or – alternatively – heterogene-
ous, conflicting norms handicap decision-making. There are 
programmed to provide an answer based on the data they’ve learned. 
That is, we can see their conclusions, but most of the time we don’t 
know how they arrived at them. That limits our ability to improve AI 
when something goes wrong, as well as learn from them when they 
make a decision that wouldn’t occur to us”. Dave Gershgorn, “We Don’t 
Understand How AI Make Most Decisions, So Now Algorithms Are 
Explaining Themselves”, Quartz, December 20, 2016 (retrieved from 
https:// qz.com/865357/we-dont-understand-how-ai-make-most-deci-
sions-so-now-algorithms-are-explaining-themselves/ on May 18, 2018).
88 Brian Tomasik, “Interpreting the Categorical Imperative”, 2015 
(retrieved from http:// briantomasik.com/interpreting-the-categorical-
imperative/ on April 8. 2018).
89 The hypothetical imperative will not be considered here for it is 
combined with a consequentialist approach. Furthermore, the formula 
‘you shall do A to achieve B’ would require an ethical (categorical imper-
ative vased) test of both elements separately; the aim as well as the tool.
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controversial and dilemmatic issues, as yet unresolved prob-
lems, and novel challenges belonging to the practical contexts 
with such normative deficits. To construct a suitable model, 
several stages of algorithms would be essential:
(0) circumstances with respect to the practical context 
related algorithms able to detect, qualify, collect, and 
select data necessary to construct a descriptive (mate-
rial) purpose of practical maxims;
(1) algorithms selecting ethically relevant data in respect 
of the experiential context;
(2) algorithms constructing the maxims in a correct way;
(3) algorithms checking whether there is not a legitimate 
superior legislation, the main ethical context-related 
law/norm, and procedure to testify the maxim, and 
selecting out maxims testified by existing laws/norms 
(conclusion: maxims M1 and M2 are left for the cate-
gorical imperative procedure);
(4) algorithms operating the categorical imperative for-
mula, such as for example ‘Maxim M1 is thinkable 
to become a universal law for all autonomous agents 
including myself situated in analogous practical cir-
cumstances (conclusion: M1 shall be observed at all 
analogous times regardless of alternatives, in Kant’s 
terms “pathological” motives/ incentives).
(5) in particularly socially sensitive circumstances, the 
algorithms which detect all related autonomous sub-
jects and define them in terms of autotelic “ends”, 
including natural and artificial agents.
(6) algorithms responsible for consulting all related 
autonomous agents and asking for their acceptance, 
negotiating their participation or contribution when 
an intended action is cooperative in nature, or it must 
involve persons’ “conscious consent” typical for med-
ical contexts.
I do not insist on this simplified categorical imperative 
procedure to be the sole criterion for ethical decision-making 
in AI. I do not even insist that it should be prior to all other 
ethical and metaethical procedures of providing moral rea-
sonings with some consistency and transparency to make 
morally relevant choices and decisions legitimate in a uni-
versal way, as was originally thought in Kant’s ethics for 
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autonomous human agents. Certainly, Kant’s conception 
and the simplified categorical imperative procedure are 
not equivalent in meaning, especially since here autonomy is 
disconnected from the metaphysical notion of “Humanity” as 
being absolutely valuable, i.e., “whose existence in itself had 
an absolute worth,” and its implications limited to humanity 
(accordingly, in the thought experiment conducted here all 
the autonomous agents’ existence remains absolutely valu-
able). I merely suggest that statistical, mathematical, ana-
lytical, utilitarian, consequentialist, altruistic, empathic, 
virtue, etc. -based decision procedures are as less efficient 
among human agents, let alone artificial ones.
IV. “No one really knows how the most advanced algorithms do what they do”90. 
Discussing possible implications and limitations
Teaching machines how to apply the categorical imperative 
test may have important implications not only for numerous 
fields such as medical care, military, security, management 
and investment decision-making where people rely on arti-
ficial intelligent agents. As already mentioned above, con-
troversial, dilemmatic and novel challenges belong to them. 
“As deep-learning algorithms begin to set our life insurance 
rates and predict when we’ll die, many AI experts are call-
ing for more accountability around why those algorithms 
make the decisions they do. After all, if a self-driving car 
kills someone, we’d want to know what happened”91.
The risky developments involving decisions being made 
differently than human agents would make them could be 
prevented. Even algorithm and software developers only 
rarely understand how autonomous AI really processes its 
90 Will Knight, “The Dark Secret in the Heart of AI. No One Real-
ly Knows How the Most Advanced Algorithms Do What They Do. 
That Could Be a Problem”, MIT Technology Review of April 11, 2017 
(retrieved from https:// www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-
secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ on April 11, 2018).
91 Dave Gershgorn, “The Case Against Understanding Why AI 
Makes Decisions”, Quartz of January 31, 2018 (retrieved from htt-
ps:// qz.com/1192977/the-case-against-understanding-why-ai-makes-
decisions/ on May 6, 2018).
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resolutions and reaches its conclusions, as Knight92 stress-
es. Even less do we know about its ethical decision-making, 
including the question of whether it is integrated, hierarchi-
cal, etc., e.g., whether causal or logical interactions among 
always the same elements of the system occur, or whether 
they rather occur among alternative elements; or selected 
elements build lower and higher subsystems, as – hypothet-
ically – a system of ‘maxims’ and a systemn of ‘imperatives’; 
or whether a system of elements “generates a cause-effect 
information” which could be be considered in moral terms93. 
For it shows that with regard to this secret attitude, an arti-
ficial mind ressembles a “black box”. Logical and deonto-
logical schemes such as the categorical imperative would 
enable humans to better track AI decision-making process 
and “to interrogate an AI system” (cf.) about its explanations, 
argumentations, and justifications in favor of or against a pre-
ferred conduct, especially in the face of novel and demanding 
contexts. Consequently, the reciprocal comprehension would 
also facilitate communication between natural and artificial 
intelligence and advances in the AI learning process as well. 
In this paper I argue in favor of understanding the complex-
ity (and in favor of complexity as well) rather than in favor 
of the simplification of the AI’s complexity in order to make 
it more transparent for human minds, for it would necessar-
ily imply decreasing the benefits for humanity. I agree with 
Weinberger’s argument:
“Human-constructed models aim at reducing the vari-
ables to a set small enough for our intellects to under-
stand. Machine learning models can construct models that 
work (…) but that cannot be reduced enough for humans 
to understand or to explain them. This understandably 
concerns us. We think of these systems as making deci-
sions, and we want to make sure they make the right mor-
al decisions by doing what we do with humans: we ask for 
explanations that present the moral principles that were 
applied and the facts that led to them being applied that 
way. ‘Why did you steal the apple?’ can be justified and 
explained by saying ‘Because it had been stolen from me,’ 
‘It was poisoned and I didn’t want anyone else to eat it’ or 
92 W. Knight, “The Dark Secret in the Heart of AI”, op. cit.
93 G. Tononi, “Integrated…”, op. cit., p. 297.
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‘Because I was hungry and I didn’t have enough money 
to pay for it.’ These explanations work by disputing the 
primacy of the principle that it’s wrong to steal. It’s thus 
natural for us to think about what principles we want 
to give our AI-based machines, and to puzzle through how 
they might be applied in particular cases. If you’d like 
to engage in these thought experiments, spend some time 
at MoralMachine.mit.edu where you’ll be asked to make 
the sort of decision familiar from the Trolley Problem”94,
but, not yet the sort of decision that is similar to the cat-
egorical imperative test. Currently, various ethical algo-
rithms are being developed and verified, in particular those 
concerning abduction. The latter can be defined as a “rea-
soning where one chooses from available hypotheses those 
that best explain the observed evidence, in some preferred 
sense”95. In the light of categorical imperative–based rea-
sonings, the available maxims could be considered to finally 
choose that which most closely corresponds to a “preferred 
sense” expressed with the imperative. Pereira and Saptawi-
jaya consider “representing moral facets by abduction” and 
“a priori integrity constraints (…) as a mechanism to gen-
erate immediate responses in deontological judgment”96 as 
possible in AI. However, abductive reasoning based on the 
preferences applied in moral dilemmas advances mixed, 
e.g., the utilitarian and deontological ethics of AI at best. 
In so doing, researchers do not respect the a priori origi-
nal meaning of the reasoning. Instead, they emphasize “the 
consequences of the considered abductibles have first to be 
computed, and only then are they evaluated to prefer the 
solution affording the greater good”97. As far as the cate-
gorical imperative procedure is concerned, the preference 
as well as the good are a priori well-known: it is all within 
moral agents’ autonomy which potential conduct expressed 
94 David Weinberger, “Optimization over Explanation. Maxi-
mizing the Beneficts of Machine Learning without Sacrificing Its 
Intelligence”, Berkman Klein Center for Internet Society at Harvard 
University (retrieved from https:// medium.com/berkman-klein-cent-
er/optimization-over-explanation-41ecb135763d on Februar 1, 2018).
95 Luis Moniz Pereira, Ari Saptawijaya, Programming Machine 
Ethics, Springer International Publishing, Switzerland 2016, p. 35.
96 Ibidem, p. 35-38.
97 Ibidem, p. 38.
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with a maxim is to be validated as conforming to all the 
agents’ autonomous self-governance or not. Further prefer-
ences, goods, benefits, rights, etc. remain controlled by other 
kinds of procedure. I do not insist on the unlimited suita-
bility of the categorical imperative. Other postconventional 
principles, such as the principle of not harming others, the 
Radbruch formula, the respect and reciprocal recognition 
principle, the rule of constitution, etc., rather belong to the 
basic principles of fair and just conduct. Utilitarian proce-
dures seem not to be a sufficient warranty of those qualities 
of conduct in both humans and AI. “In humans, the individ-
ual understanding that there exists a self in relation to oth-
ers makes possible participation in moral community”98. 
Unlike in humans, such an advanced and interactive self-
understanding cannot be expected in artificial agents as 
they are, and, most probably remain “rather simple-minded 
agents”99. For this reason, sociomoral principles and meta-
principles, such as for example the unconditional categor-
ical imperative, would certainly minimize restrictions and 
the harm inflicted on human or animal beings by AI-made 
self-willed solutions and decisions. At the same time, the 
AI’s autonomy could get some novel dimensions, very dif-
ferent from a “slavish conformity to ethical rules”100, as 
explained in previous sections. It does not so much need 
sophisticated ethical theory produced over the millennia 
and questioned by. It rather needs a trained ability to make 
decisions in manifold practical and social contexts, when 
service, social assistance, companionship, and other rela-
tions with humans come intio play.
According to Kant, the categorical imperative was 
thought to be supportive for those agents who face socio-
morally relevant choices in contexts lacking normative guid-
ance or ruled by unjust institutions. It also was thought 
to disclose, track and self-examine normative reasonings 
carried out by autonomously minded moral agents. Most 
probably, it was also supposed to be the most rational stage 
98 Ibidem, p. 163.
99 Ibidem, p. 164.
100 Paula Boddington, Towards a Code of Ethics for Artificial Intel-
ligence, Springer International Publishing, Oxford 2017, p. 55.
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in humanity’s moral development. The main practical prin-
ciple provides an agent with her own, autonomous and uni-
versally applicable normative tool. In Kant, the procedure 
to examine own moral reasonings, called conscientia, also 
relies on the same normative tool.
Designing autonomous AI nowadays, human agents try 
hard to instil principled self-determination into artificial 
agents. But sharing human autonomy with human-like 
agents results in challenges. They sometimes ressemble inter-
human challenges, such as for example trust and reliance on 
others. In fact, humans design autonomous AI in their own 
image to stay in relations with them. Humans stay in rela-
tions with others not just because the latter are autonomous, 
but able to control their activities within relationships. This 
kind of self-control implies respect and minimizes the risk. 
Otherwise, humans would not be able to trust their fellow 
humanoids as they do so with their fellow humans. Con-
temporary ethics often resists “Kantian attempts” to make 
social interrelations “a matter mainly of justifying universal 
principles for ideal rational agents”101 whose observable per-
formance would visualize at least the conclusions of their cog-
nitive operations. According to Couzens Hoy, it also objects 
“to Hegelian attempts to assimilate otherness and to see the 
other as the mirror of the self”102. Perception seems to be the 
key concept in contemporary cognitive sciences and, most 
probably, it is an immediate communication tool between 
human and non-human agents including animals and intel-
ligent devices. The verb observe the rule seems to link per-
ceptual ability with intelligible apperception and following 
the norms together. “The key PCT contribution (…) is that 
human or animal organism controls neither its own behav-
ior, nor external environmental variables, but rather its own 
perceptions (…) This fundamentally contradicts the classical 
notion of linear causation of behavior by stimuli (…) mediat-
ed by intervening cognitive processes”103. Tracking our own
101 David Couzens Hoy, Critical Resistance. From Poststructuralism 
to Post-Critique, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. – London 2005, p. 164.
102 Ibidem.
103 Vladimir G. Ivancevic, Darryn J. Reid, Michael J. Pilling, Math-
ematics of Autonomy. Mathematical Methods for Cyber-Physical-Cog-
nitive Systems, World Scientific, New Jersey 2017, p. 128
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perceptions and other kinds of experiential and cognitive 
processes as well was already paradigmatic for transcen-
dental philosophy (“Experience is cognition through con-
nected perceptions”, as Kant puts it in his first Critique). 
Transcendentalism questioned the mind-independent uni-
verse, in particular the moral universe, and explored all nec-
essary preconditions of our cognitive access to it instead. It 
also revealed a unique, formal principle issued by practical 
reason, observable for all intelligent agents. This principle 
provides our motives and intentions expressed in “maxims” 
with at least potential universal validity. Those intentions 
are strong enough to empower us as being cohabitants and 
fellow human beings to exercise our freedom, and thus our 
free will, in the real world.
However, unlike in human beings, “one ‘special proper-
ty’ some believe is not to be found in any computational 
technology yet developed is free will. Conscious understand-
ing is another.”104 Free will according to Kant is intelligent 
by nature and oriented towards the normative meaning 
of maxims successfully examined by the categorical imper-
ative test, and it strives for independent self-governance. 
Observing principles may immediately be regarded as law 
(unmittelbarer Bestimmungsgrund) following their mental 
representation of a duty, law, institution, etc. (Vorstellung 
des Gesetzes). In Kant’s conception of principled autonomy 
there is no place for a linear normative causation of cor-
responding activity. An autonomous agent spontaneous-
ly decides to act accordingly as soon as they feel obliged 
to follow a universalizable maxim. Such an inner, intelligi-
ble, pre-deontic self-obligation (Achtung) and the will freely 
wanting the self-given rule cannot be expected in AI, for the 
latter is designed in the image of cognitive processes occur-
ing in human minds. What is intelligible in Kant cannot be 
reduced to the cognitivism, despite the fact that Davidson 
did so in his causalistic description of “mental and nomolog-
ical activities”105. “Consider, for example, Kant’s contention 
104 C. Allen, W. Wallach, Moral Machines. Teaching Robots Right 
from Wrong, op. cit., p. 59.
105 Donald Davidson, “Mental Events”, Philosophy of Psychology, 
1970, pp. 208–225.
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that will and autonomy are necessary for an entity to be 
a moral agent. The ability to function as an autonomous 
being, or the capacity to will, suggest faculties beyond pure 
reason. However, little is understood regarding the manner 
in which the Kantian will and autonomy are supported by 
and emerge from the capacity to reason and other cognitive 
mechanisms.”106 It is to stress once again, that observing 
practical rules given in an autonomous way which is imagi-
nable for human as well as for artificial minds does not occur 
in a causal or deterministic way. Although, here we have 
to take note of the important distinction between rational 
procedures on the one hand and cognitive mechanisms on 
the other, both levels are considered as “autonomous” by 
Kant and Wittgenstein. A rational moral agent conscious-
ly and deliberately decides to act in accordance (or discord-
ance) to a rule, law, or other normative criterion. Moreover, 
a mental moral agent feels obliged to follow it due to the 
rule’s imperativeness. Such a unique, preoriginally meta-
physical, “intelligible” self-commitment cannot be expected 
either in a cognitive agent or in an intelligent arificial agent. 
Here observing practical rules and acting accordingly may 
occur spontaneously, automatically and inexplicably. Both 
kinds of agents seem to make principled moral judgments 
and decisions; both of them make them every time de novo. 
None of them represents an autopilot-, routine-, and robot-
ic-like rule-following mode. The latter seems to be the most 
pragmatic and provident, but, in fact, it undermines auton-
omy as a key attitude of the moral condition sensu largis-
simo107. To conclude, it does not contribute to autonomy, 
106 W. Wallach, “Robot Minds and Human Ethics”, op. cit., pp. 245-246.
107 Examining spontaneity by Wittgenstein, Vossenkuhl explains: 
“das erste Merkmal des spontanen Regefolgens ist, daß wir einer Regel 
jedesmal so folgen, als wäre es das erste Mal. Der Regelfolger verhält 
sich autonom und ganz sebständig, wenn er einer Regel folgt. Nennen 
wir dieses Merkmal Autonomie-Merkmal. (…) Ich kann also ‘etwas 
Neues’ tun ‘trotz vielfacher Wiederholung’ (…) Einer Regel folgen 
heiße, ‘jedesmal etwas anderes tun’, es komme nicht darauf, immer 
das Gleiche zu tun”, W. Vossenkuhl, Ludwig Wittgenstein, p. 270. 
However, Wittgenstein’s further explanations, in particular the “inex-
plicability” (die Nicht-Erklärbarkeit) of the spontaneous cognitive-per-
formative mode of the rule following are incompatible with Kantian 
rationalism, see ibidem, p. 271. In Wittgenstein, the normative 
202 | Ewa Nowak |
subjectivity, or selfhood as they used to be interpreted in the 
two most distinct, nowadays competing modern paradigms 
of personal morality, i.e., in the rationalist and the cognitiv-
ist. Rule comprehension, following rules adequately (be it 
deliberately, or purely “performatively”108 and “spontaneous-
ly”), being an autonomous agent and embodying any moral 
self (be it continuous, episodic or “finite”) belong together. As 
soon as all those aspects are disconnected one from anoth-
er, ethicists, moral psychologists and cognitive scientists are 
challenged to define, or even invent an artificial, other than 
human-like selfhood.
explanation, justification, and – finally – obligation of a given judg-
ment or decision are substituted with logical neccessity, first-person 
certainty strengthened by an intersubjective agreement (“Überein-
stimmung in Urteilen”) and the “community view,” see ibidem. This 
kind of rule-following might be considered as direct decision-making 
and was called by Wittgenstein “practical”, see James C. Edwards, 
Ethics without Philosophy. Wittgenstein and the Moral Life, Univer-
sity of Florida Press, 1989, and David Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and 
Institutions, Routledge, New York 1997.
108 Wittgenstein’s postethical, cognitive/intuitive decision maker is, 
in fact, a strong one for he embodies the sole instance able to empower 
the practical rules and institutions’ validity when and only when prac-
ticing them. The rules in themselves are neither right, nor wrong, as 
Wittgenstein puts it in Über Gewissheit, § 612. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 
1984. “And what is needed is not explanation but training – compa-
rable with the training yu would give an animal,” Rush Rees, Preface 
to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical 
Investigations” Generally Known As The Blue ans Brown Books, Harp-
er Torchbooks, Harper & Row Publishers, New York 1958, viii. The 
question, how much Wittgenstein’s moral cognition approach would 
apply to the AI advancements today, would deserve further studies. 
Bloor explored “… Wittgenstein’s reconciliation of the blind charac-
ter of rule following with the conscientiousness condition. We can be 
´blindly conscientious’,” he shows. “We follow some rules automat-
ically, but do so within a social framework to which we are known 
to be responsive, and within which we operate according to accepta-
ble standards of competence and awareness. In this way we can be 
said to ´think´ or ´know´ that we are following a rule, even though we 
are responding ´blindly´. The conscientiousness condition is not, ulti-
mately, an odds with what Wittgenstein wants to say about interpreta-
tion coming to an end,” D. Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, 
p. 52 (underlines of E.N.). However, blind does not mean to bloun-
der around, nor it is to be at the mercy of a sheer chance; rather, it is 
a kind of a voice inside of a decision maker who is also able to justify 
his decision, e.g. to indicate suitable criteria – rules and institutions.
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